

EROS IN GOVERNMENT: ZENO AND THE VIRTUOUS CITY

According to a report in Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* 561CD), the qualities of Eros led the Stoic Zeno to make him the tutelary god of his ideal state:

Ποντιανὸς δὲ Ζήνωντα ἔφη τὸν Κιτέα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ἐρωτα θεὸν εἶναι φιλίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁμονοίας παρασκευαστικόν, ἄλλου δ' οὐδενός. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἔφη τὸν Ἐρωτα θεὸν εἶναι συνεργόν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν.

Pontianus said that Zeno of Citium took Eros to be the god of love and freedom, and even the provider of concord, but nothing else. This is why he said in his *Republic* that Eros was the god who contributed to the safety of the city.

But why Eros? The Stoics believed that wisdom was the basis of happiness and security, and we might have expected Zeno to choose a more intellectual patron: even the imperfect city in which he founded the Stoa could appeal to the care of Athena. Eros is a surprising choice for a Stoic city.

As it happens, not everyone agrees that Zeno was a Stoic when he wrote his *Republic*. We are told that the *Republic* was an early work, and already in antiquity there were those who believed that it was actually a product of the Cynical phase through which Zeno passed before going on to found the Stoa.¹ And yet if this were true it would only make matters worse, since the Cynics as a school would be even less likely to want to pay homage to Eros than the Stoics. The Stoics thought of sex as indifferent (neither morally good nor morally bad), but indifference was only the best reaction that it elicited from the Cynics, who viewed it at times with outright horror. This is not only because some Cynics showed a pathological aversion to pleasure quite generally (cf. Antisthenes apud D.L. 6.3), but also because they thought that the urge to sexual union tended to compromise the independence which was a major constituent of Cynical happiness. (Masturbation is a convenient way around this problem, and the Cynic Diogenes not only saw this as the best solution, but even wished that an analogous solution was available for pangs of hunger.²) It does not help, then, to assume that Zeno wrote his *Republic* as a Cynic. But it remains to ask how as a Stoic he could have given such a leading role to Eros.

Leaving aside the special considerations of Stoicism for a moment, there is a natural way in which the claim that *love* contributes to the harmony, and so the safety, of the city might be understood. It might be thought that love simply binds together

¹ Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno wrote the *Republic* while he was studying under Crates (D.L. 7.4); and Philodemus says that some Stoics tried to excuse the embarrassingly 'Cynical' elements of the work (such as its notorious tolerance towards incest, for example) on the grounds that Zeno was very young when he wrote the work (*de Stoicis* 9.1–3 in the edition of T. Dorandi, *Cronache Ercolanesi* 12 [1982], 91–133). Cf. J.M.Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969), p. 64; P.Steinmetz in H. Flashar (ed.), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* 4 (Basel, 1994), p. 522. But strong reasons to doubt this evidence have been adduced by A.Erskine (*The Hellenistic Stoa* [Ithaca, 1990], pp. 9–15), who argues that the work must have been written at the very earliest when Zeno was a pupil of Polemo (after he was a pupil of Crates: D.L. 7.1). The very fact that later Stoics tried to argue it back into an earlier phase of his life only shows that their critics could assume that it was actually a work of his maturity.

² See D.L. 6.46, 69, Plutarch, *de Stoic. rep.* 21, 1044B, and esp. Dio Chrysostom, *or.* 6.18–19.

the citizens in relationships which make them look outside of their private interests and work for the good of each other, and so for the good of the city as a whole.³ Now Eros is the god, specifically, of passionate, sexual relationships, but this need not raise a significant difficulty, as it happens, because there is a certain kind of sexual relationship which was considered by many Greeks to be very important for the cohesion of the city: sexual relations between men and youths. Such relationships were taken to play such an important role in fostering cohesion where it mattered—among the male population—that Lycurgus even gave them official recognition in his constitution for Sparta.⁴

The Stoics, as I said, thought that sexual gratification was strictly speaking indifferent; but in the technical terms of Stoicism, it was definitely a 'preferred indifferent'. It didn't matter if you didn't get it, but it's right to take it if it's there. Zeno himself was an advocate, his enemies said a rather overzealous advocate, of pederastic relationships (*SVF* 1.247, 253; and cf. 250–2), so it seems like a straightforward step to suppose that he had precisely this kind of thing in mind when he placed the concord and safety of the city in the quiver of Eros.⁵ Unfortunately, things are not this straightforward. For one thing, none of this explains why Eros should be said to be the god of *freedom* as well as of love (indeed, Eros as the god of love is more commonly viewed as an *enslaver*),⁶ or why *this* aspect of his province should also enable him to bring concord to the state, as Athenaeus (or rather Pontianus) clearly states it does.⁷ For another, Zeno's attitude towards sexual relations was nowhere near as straightforward as I have just suggested. It is true that he enjoyed and enjoined physical relationships with young males, and with young females too (*SVF* 1.250). But he says in the same place that a man should have sex no more with 'favourites' (*παιδικά*) than with non-favourites (*μὴ παιδικά*). This explodes the whole social function of such relationships. Zeno cannot think *both* that sexual relationships are of such indifference that it does not matter who you do it with, *and* that they are something which have the special function of creating the kinds of bonds and moral obligations around which society coheres. In fact, while Zeno may have thought of sexual encounters as innocently enjoyable (and so, in Stoic terms, a preferred indifferent), he simply did *not* think that they were important. The ideal relationship between a man and a youth is for him primarily a pedagogical one, one based on the 'beauty' a boy shows in his potential for virtue, and not one based on a desire to

³ Cf. I. Hadot, 'Tradition Stoïcienne et Idées Politiques au Temps des Gracques', *Revue des Études Latines* 48 (1970), 133–79, at p. 150.

⁴ Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 17–18 (esp. 17.1, 18.4). See M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 34–42 with K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London, 1978), pp. 201–2. Cf. Plato, *Republic* 5, 468b12–c4, where soldiers are encouraged to greater courage in the protection of the state by the promise of licence to extract kisses from any youth (male or, in this case, female as well): 'so that if one of them should be in love with a boy or a girl, he might be keener to win the prize for valour'.

⁵ This is the line taken by Schofield in *The Stoic Idea of the City*, chapter 2.

⁶ E.g. Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.3.11; Plato, *Symposium* 196b4–d4, *Republic* 1, 329b8–c4. Already in Homer (*Iliad* 14.315–6), *ἔρος* (not personified) can 'conquer' (*δραμάζειν*) the heart even of Zeus, as *Ἔρος* (now personified) conquers the mind of gods and men in Hesiod (*Theogony* 120–2). For Eros as a 'tyrant', see esp. Euripides fr. 132 [Nauck] (and note that the longest version of this fragment comes from Athenaeus 561BC, immediately before the attestation of Zeno's views on Eros and the city with which it is contrasted).

⁷ Schofield admits the difficulty of this claim on his interpretation, and concludes that Athenaeus has mistakenly interpolated the point about freedom into Pontianus' account of Zeno (*The Stoic Idea of the City*, pp. 48–56).

benefit from his physical beauty (D.L. 7.129). Even this is not an ideal relationship *tout court*, because the only truly beautiful and desirable people on this score are those who are actually virtuous—sages themselves (Plutarch, *de comm. not.* 1072F–3B). But however we describe these relationships, and whatever happens within them (although Zeno certainly never suggests that intercourse between sages will be of the sexual variety), they are not passionate, and should not fall under the remit of Eros. Eros as the god of passion *par excellence* ought to be anathema to Zeno, and no more a figurehead of the state than gods of hatred, greed, or anger (cf. D.L. 7.113). So what is he doing there?

It might be that modern scholarship has betrayed a rather one-track mind in its approach to this topic, for the unquestioning identification of Eros and sexual passion is not justified by ancient theology: there had in fact always been *two* traditions concerning this god. According to the popular tradition he was, to be sure, the capricious son of Aphrodite, a source of sexual passion in men and his fellow-gods. But according to the other tradition he took on a more serious aspect, as a figure of supreme cosmological importance. For Eros was also the *Πρωτόγονος*: not the son of Aphrodite, but the first being, who emerged from Chaos in the beginning and formed the world in order and harmony. And Eros in this guise was established in the Greek philosophical tradition long before his popular counterpart came to be taken seriously.⁸

We have, it is true, no *direct* evidence that Zeno thought of Eros in cosmological terms. But we do know that the view entered the Stoa at some point, because the Stoic

⁸ Cf. F.Lasserre, *La Figure d'Eros dans la Poésie Grecque* (Lausanne, 1946), pp. 130–49. In Hesiod (*Theogony* 116–22 with M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* [Oxford, 1966], pp. 195–6), as in the fifth-century mythographer Acusilaus (9 B1–3 [D.-K.]), Earth and Eros are the first beings to emerge from Chaos. Eros also played an important role in Orphic cosmology, where he had been identified early on with Phanes as *πρωτόγονος* (Orpheus fr. 74, 82 [Kern] with M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* [Oxford, 1983], p. 203; cf. Euripides, *Hypsipyle* fr. 57, 22–3 [Bond] = Orpheus fr. 2 [Kern]). For the cosmogonical role of Phanes/Eros, see e.g. Orpheus fr. 1 (= Aristophanes, *Birds* 690–702), 54, 85 [Kern]. (West, 'Ab Ovo', *CQ* 44 [1994], 289–307, esp. p. 304, suggests a link with the Phoenician cosmogonies recorded by Eudemus (fr. 150, p. 71, 1–15 [Wehrli]) and Sanchuniathon of Beirut (*apud* Philo Byblos, *FGrH* IIIC 790, F2, pp. 806, 15–807, 9), both of which involve personified Desire.) Pherecydes (7 B3 [D.-K.]) is reported to have said that Zas (Zeus) became Eros in order to create the world out of opposites, bringing *ὁμολογία*, *φιλία*, and *ἐνώσις* to the whole—but the accuracy of this report has been questioned: see West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford, 1971), p. 17; and G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 62 ad fr. 54, where it is suggested, perhaps significantly in the light of my argument, that the fragment represents a 'palpably Stoic interpretation'. See also Plato, *Symp.* 178a6–c2 (which is the source for one of the fragments of Acusilaus mentioned above); Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.4, 984b23–5a10. One of the most powerful poetic expressions of this tradition is the short poem by Simias of Rhodes, the *Πτέρυγες Ἐρωτος* (*Anth. Graec.* 15.24). Simias has Eros himself refute the claim that Aphrodite was his mother: 'For I was born when Necessity was ruler... I am called the son of Chaos, not of Cypris or Ares.' (He drives home the point by describing Eros as a small boy, but with a heavy beard. This grotesque clash of age symbolism has an interesting parallel in a Stoic text I shall refer to later, in which Eros is described as 'young and the oldest of all'.) Eros, in Simias' poem, is 'lord of the broad-bosomed earth, who set in place Acmonidas'—that is, Uranus, the heaven itself. Elsewhere more of an attempt is made to reconcile the cosmogonical tradition with the popular ancestry of Eros, and we sometimes find aspects of Eros' cosmological role transferred to Aphrodite. Cf. *Orphic Hymn* 55, and Orpheus fr. 184 [Kern]. Empedocles' *φιλία* is personified as Aphrodite (esp. 31 B17 [D.-K.]); and although Parmenides says that Eros was created 'very first of all', he most probably meant that he was the first creation of that goddess (see the texts at 28 B13 [D.-K.]). Cf. also Socrates in the *Symposiums* of Plato (180de) and, especially, Xenophon (8.9–11).

allegorist Cornutus, writing in the first century A.D., passed on a fully stoicized version of it. In chapter 25 of the *Introduction to Greek Theology*, Cornutus discusses the rationale behind the traditional representation of Eros in Greek mythology; and he gives interpretations corresponding to *both* the traditions I have mentioned. The more common interpretation (47,1–48,4 [Lang]) is, he says, the one according to which Eros is the son of Aphrodite. In this version, he is depicted as a boy, because those who are in love have ‘imperfect reason’ and are easily deceived; he is winged because they are light-headed (or because thoughts of love constantly flit into their heads); he carries a torch because their souls are burned, and arrows because the very sight of their beloved makes them feel they have sustained a wound. But *some* people (and here we enter the obviously Stoic material) hold that Eros performs a very different role. He is to be identified with the whole cosmos (48,5–9 [Lang]):

ἐνιοι δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον νομίζουσιν Ἔρωτα εἶναι, καλὸν τε καὶ ἐπαφρόδιτον καὶ νεαρὸν ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτατον ἅμα πάντων καὶ πολλῶ κεχρημένον πυρὶ καὶ ταχείαν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τοξείας ἢ διὰ πτερῶν τὴν κίνησιν ποιούμενον.

Some people consider the whole cosmos to be Eros: beautiful, desirable, young and at the same time the oldest thing of all; possessing much fire, and the cause of motion swift as if shot from a bow or propelled by wings.

The first picture of Eros only confirms how unwelcome such a god would be to the Stoics. In this picture, Eros is the god of unreason, the antithesis of all that the supremely rationalistic Stoics could wish for. But the latter picture, from which even the association with unreason found in Hesiod’s cosmological Eros (*Theogony* 120–2) has been expunged, is pure Stoicism. Eros as cosmos is rich in fire: the Stoics thought that the cosmos was created from fire. And the emphasis on movement here also suggests Stoic cosmology (Chrysippus says that motion underlies cosmic order: see Plutarch, *de Stoic. rep.* 34, 1049F–50A). The fact that the cosmos, like Eros, is both young and ‘the oldest of all’ might make us think of the doctrine of the cyclical regeneration of the universe propounded by the Stoics; and we have independent evidence that the Stoics call the cosmos beautiful (καλός: cf. *SVF* 1.1009, p.299, 15).⁹ The identification of the Stoics behind this ‘reading’ of Eros is confirmed (if it needed confirming) by the paragraphs that follow all of this, where ‘the same people’ continue with allegorical exegesis of other gods which is uniquely and undeniably Stoic in content. It is clear, in short, that at least some Stoics thought of Eros not as a god whose function was essentially to be ‘erotic’, but as the god who explained the beauty of creation, the beauty inherent in the order of the universe. And, if Eros had this scope already for Zeno (there is reason to think that Cornutus’ account might go back at least as far as Cleanthes, one of Zeno’s pupils),¹⁰ then we can start to understand why his presence in the city is so desirable. If Eros can bind the cosmos together in harmonious order, then he can do the same for the city.

⁹ We do not have any (other) direct evidence that the Stoics referred to the cosmos as ἐπαφρόδιτος. But the sage is called ἐπαφρόδιτος, and he is called this precisely in virtue of being καλός. See Stobaeus, *eccl.* 2, p. 108, 5–12 [Wachsmuth] with Plutarch, *de comm. not.* 28, 1072F–3B.

¹⁰ Cornutus attributes his account of the cosmological Eros rather vaguely to ‘some people’ (which means some Stoics, as I have shown). But in the chapter that follows this account (chapter 26 of his *Introduction*), the *same* people who identified the cosmos with Eros are also said to identify it with Atlas, whose providence guarantees the salvation of all of its parts (προνοεῖσθαι τῆς πάντων [αὐτοῦ] τῶν μερῶν σωτηρίας: p. 48, 16–17 [Lang]). And we know that Cleanthes said precisely this, from the passages given at *SVF* 1.549. What is more, the variant reading ὁλόσφρονα (with rough breathing) at Cornutus p. 48, 15 [Lang] would be explained if the passage did derive from Cleanthes, since we are told that Cleanthes aspirated the initial letter of

It is possible to be more precise about how Eros would be supposed to discharge his cohesive function in the city as a cosmological deity. For we know that Zeno thought that the internal harmony and order of a city depended somehow on the way in which its constitution and actions conformed with nature (with the cosmos as a whole). And we know this because we are told that the virtue and happiness of a city is just like the virtue and happiness of an individual (Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 31, 59A, a passage which von Arnim appositely bracketed together with the Athenaeus passage with which this paper started, as *SVF* 1.263).¹¹

... ὥσπερ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν . . .

[Zeno, among others,] reckoned that the happiness of the whole city, like the happiness in the life of a single man, comes from virtue and harmony with itself . . .

The point of this is that, for the Stoics, an individual's harmony with himself is just a function of his harmony with nature, since he is himself a part of nature.¹² Insofar as the city is part of nature too,¹³ it will achieve happiness and internal harmony just when it is also brought into harmony with the cosmos. And it is Eros as cosmos who presides over this state of harmony.

If it is possible to see how Eros *can* function as the tutelary god of the state, it might still be unclear why Zeno chose *him* above all the other gods whom the Stoics identified with nature and order. However able Eros may have turned out to be in the political sphere, Zeus' long experience of kingship might have made him, for example, a more natural choice. It is not even the case that Eros is ever associated with virtue more generally elsewhere in Stoicism. But actually there is a simple answer to all of this, which emerges if we consider again the *internal* harmony which, as a consequence of its harmony with nature, constitutes the virtue of a city. For the internal harmony of a city must be dependent quite specifically on harmonious relationships existing between all of its citizens, and to this extent on the love that the citizens have for each other. And this kind of love is precisely the love of the cosmological Eros: it is the love by which the disparate elements of chaos were brought together into the harmonious arrangement of the cosmos. We know that all of the citizens of Zeno's ideal state are virtuous (D.L. 7.33),¹⁴ so it follows that they do

ΟΛΟΟΦΡΩΝ to explain its special application to Atlas. It might be added that in chapter 27 the same people again identify the cosmos with Pan, and we find here too material that can be traced back to an earlier stage in the Stoa: it was already present in the work of Apollodorus, the second-century pupil of the Stoic Panaetius (see *FGrH* IIB, 244 F136a–b).

The cosmological Eros is clearly presupposed by a passage which von Arnim took to be a fragment of another of Zeno's pupils, Chrysippus: see *SVF* 2.565 (from the scholia on Hesiod, *Theogony* 115). Unfortunately, the attribution of this fragment to the Stoics, let alone to a particular Stoic, cannot be objectively established.

¹¹ Plutarch attributes this view to Lycurgus, Plato, Diogenes, 'and others' as well, but this does not weaken its use as evidence for Zeno: each thinker would naturally interpret the view as expressed in his own terms. Furthermore, we have evidence for the Stoics at large that they thought the ideal city was virtuous in a way analogous to an individual: see *SVF* 3.327 and 328, where the city is called *σπουδαῖος* (Cleanthes calls it *ἀστειος* as well in 328), a term more usually employed by the Stoics to indicate the virtuous character of the sage.

¹² Hence Zeno's definition of the moral end: 'to live consistently' (*ὁμολογουμένως* ζῆν: Stobaeus, *ecl.* 2, p. 75,11–12 [Wachsmuth]). Zeno seems to have left this deliberately ambiguous, between living consistently *with nature* and living consistently *full stop*.

¹³ It must make sense to call the city 'part of nature', since it is a natural product of humanity: see Stobaeus, *ecl.* 2, p. 54,4–7 [Wachsmuth]; Cicero, *de fin.* 3.65.

¹⁴ Note that, while all *citizens* of Zeno's state are virtuous, this does not mean that all *members*

love one another in the appropriate sense (*SVF* 1.223).¹⁵ And it is *because* they love one another in this sense that the state itself is harmonious and can be called virtuous and happy in its own right.

Eros, then, is the most appropriate representative of the virtue of the state. But this does not mean that he is the most appropriate representative of virtue more generally. The reason for this is that, apart from the cosmos itself, it is only in the case of the city that there are parts amenable to the harmonizing influence of Love. Plato, to be sure, thought that individual virtue was, just like virtue in the state, a matter of bringing the elements of the soul into harmonious relationship. But the Stoics decisively did not. For the Stoics, there were no parts to the soul (which was pure intellect), and they criticized Plato precisely for his 'political' account of individual virtue.¹⁶ Eros, in short, is emblematic quite specifically of the virtue of the state.

Finally, if the concord of the state is dependent on Eros, then we can explain why Eros can be called the god of freedom as well. We know that only sages are truly free (indeed we know this from a fragment of Zeno's *Republic*: D.L. 7.33), and we can surmise that the explanation of their freedom is their perfect conformity to nature and the will of god. They are free because their will is never thwarted, because their harmonious relationship with the world ensures that they will never wish for outcomes which are at odds with nature.¹⁷ And if it makes sense for Zeno to attribute virtue and happiness to the city in its own right (as we have seen that he did), it will also make sense for him to give it all the associated attributes, freedom included, and to thank Eros for this boon as well.

of the state will be virtuous. Children, in particular, cannot be virtuous, as I have noted. This distinction between citizens and members of a state (which Aristotle discussed in *Politics* 3.5) is very important, and helps to solve a contradiction which is perceived to exist in the testimonia for Chrysippus' political work too. Chrysippus also thinks that only sages are citizens of the cosmopolis, his ideal state (cf. *SVF* 3.328, 679–80); but many of our fragments say that the cosmopolis includes *all* men (e.g. *SVF* 2.527–8, 3.327–8, 333, 339, 341). The explanation for this is that none of these 'inclusive' fragments talk about *citizenship* of the ideal state, but only in more general terms of inclusion. And 'included' members who are not citizens are not supposed to affect the character of the state, since they have no part in its government (cf. again Aristotle).

¹⁵ Eros does *not*, after all, account for relationships with youths, or at least he does so only to the limited extent that they show a potential for virtue (D.L. 7.129), because children are intellectually immature (cf. again Plutarch, *de comm. not.* 1072F–3B) and so cannot, in this strict sense, be loved. Pederastic relationships are not what Eros (*this* Eros) demands: in a sense, precisely the sense in which we do something 'preferable' despite its not being *good* as such, they take place *despite* Eros. Sexual relations are allowable, even desirable, but if and only if they do not compromise the virtue of the city, which it is the true function of Eros to ensure. Perhaps this is what Zeno meant when he said that Eros was the god of (true, Stoic) love, freedom, and concord, *but nothing else*.

¹⁶ Apud Plutarch, *de Stoic. rep.* 16, 1041BC, a passage which clearly looks to Plato, *Republic* 1, 351e–352a. The work from which Plutarch draws this material is named as Chrysippus' *πρὸς Πλάτωνα*, but the preceding chapter of the *de Stoic. rep.* (15, at 1040A) gives it its fuller title, *πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης* (*Against Plato Concerning Justice*). This fuller title probably points to an attack aimed specifically at Plato's *Republic*, also known to the ancients as the *περὶ Δικαίου* (D.L. 3.60).

Chrysippus did himself say that the soul had 'parts', probably as many as eight (*SVF* 2.823–33). But these are parts in the sense of 'qualities' or 'capacities', not in anything like the sense intended by Plato. The Stoics do talk of individual virtue as being a matter of internal harmony, as we have already seen, and they describe vice in the corresponding terms as a matter of internal *disharmony* (*ἀνομολογία*: cf. *SVF* 3.390, 460). But this is to be understood in terms of intellectual consistency (the consistency of one's beliefs about the world, for example), and not in terms of the interrelationship of distinct parts. There are, for the Stoics, no psychic homunculi whose harmony it makes sense to describe in the language of love.

¹⁷ And cf. Erskine, *The Hellenistic Stoa*, pp. 44–5.

Concord, then, is the crucial factor in the virtue of a state, as it is (*mutatis mutandis*) in the virtue of an individual, and in both cases the key to its attainment is harmony with nature. But in the case of the state in particular, this harmony is only achieved and guarded through the agency of that cosmological love which brought order and harmony to the elements of the cosmos itself, so that Eros can truly be said to provide for the salvation of the ideal city.¹⁸

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¹⁸ It is a matter of debate whether Zeno wrote about an ideal city-state in his *Republic* (so most recently Schofield in *The Stoic Idea of the City*), or whether he used the work to introduce into the Stoa the notion that the ideal state is the cosmos itself (a reading somewhat out of favour at the moment, but cf. e.g. Hadot, *op. cit.* n. 3). The reading I have given to Zeno's appeal to Eros will fit either picture; but the assimilation of the order of the city to the order of the cosmos is at least suggestive of a burgeoning notion of the cosmos *as* city.